Naval Institute Press
Hitler's War — Germany's Key Strategic Decisions 1940-1945
Regular price
$15.00
Hardcover, 352 pp
Copyright 1998 Arms & Armour
Proceeds from this book sale go towards the AUSA Scholarship Fund
In the summer of 1940, many options were open to the German government. Poland, Denmark, and Norway had been conquered, France decisively defeated and the British send reeling back across the English Channel.
In the summer of 1940, many options were open to the German government. Poland, Denmark, and Norway had been conquered, France decisively defeated and the British send reeling back across the English Channel.
Eighteen months later, with the United States joining the war and Germany's armed forces stalled at the gates of Moscow, the course of the war again changed direction. Was this the decisive moment? Thereafter, could Hitler have triumphed or even have saved his regime?
In this book, Heinz Magenheimer examines in detail the options that were open to the Germans as the war progressed. He identifies the crucial moments at which fateful decisions needed to be taken and considers how decisions different from those actually taken could have propelled the conflict in entirely different directions. In reconstructing the scenarios available at each stage of the war, he is careful to take into account all the factors — political, military, economic and technological affecting the decision-makers at Fuhrer Headquarters, the Foreign Ministry, the supreme commands of the three arms of the Wehrmacht and, in specific instances, those responsible for armament.
In this book, Heinz Magenheimer examines in detail the options that were open to the Germans as the war progressed. He identifies the crucial moments at which fateful decisions needed to be taken and considers how decisions different from those actually taken could have propelled the conflict in entirely different directions. In reconstructing the scenarios available at each stage of the war, he is careful to take into account all the factors — political, military, economic and technological affecting the decision-makers at Fuhrer Headquarters, the Foreign Ministry, the supreme commands of the three arms of the Wehrmacht and, in specific instances, those responsible for armament.
Using the very latest source material, in particular new research from Soviet/Russian sources, he analyses motives and objectives and considers the opportunities taken or rejected, concentrating especially on specific phases of the conflict.
Far from being just another 'whatif?' speculation, this is a closely argued and wide-ranging assessment of just how, with so many alternatives open, the German High Command chose the path that led, ultimately, to its own destruction. It is an essential new perspective on World War Two.
Heinz Magenheimer was born in Vienna in 1943 and is one of Austria's most respected military historians and commentators. Since 1972 he has been a member of the Academy of National Defence, Vienna, and since 1993 a permanent member of the editorial staff of the Austrian military periodical OMZ. In addition to five books, he has written more than a hundred articles in periodicals and compendia on the subjects of military strategy, security politics, and the history of warfare.
